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WORKING AND PLAYING WELL WITH OTHERS:
A STRATEGY-POLICY MISMATCH IN EXPORT CONTROLS
Lieutenant Colonel H. Charles Wilson III
Strategic Studies Institute

Reading through the strategic guidance that our Nation has been operating under
for a number of years, you can find a basic, common concept that I like to refer to as
“work and play well with others.” It is derived from statements like “partnerships
continue to be the principle source of our strength” 1 and “the reform of NATO
structures, capabilities and procedures must be accelerated.” 2 Those are just two
examples of the many similar references that are imbedded throughout documents
from the National Security Strategy to CJCS-approved military strategies. The concept
is also routinely reflected in guidance at lower levels of government, such as that
developed by our Combatant Commanders.
For those who have not been forced to read strategy at a War College (or who don’t
enjoy a little light reading at bed time), this theme also resonates from what our leaders
say. From congressional testimony to public speeches, our leaders have provided
consistent guidance. As Deputy Secretary England observed in July, “…for America,
this is a time for leadership, commitment and resolve—to support these emerging new
partners and allies in the war on terror.” 3
Unfortunately, it is not clear that this theme is understood or acted upon at all
echelons of government. This lack of understanding leads those who participate in
international activities and defense exports to fall back on historical bureaucratic
norms—“the way we have always done it.” A prime example of the disconnect between
strategic policy and export controls is the Danish attempt to purchase the Blue Force
Tracker to meet the U.S. push in NATO for increased interoperability through combat
identification, which faced lengthy delays due to bureaucratic hurdles. One such hurdle
was a complaint that by giving our Allies this combat identification capability they
might know where our units were, which could compromise our units from a force
protection standpoint. Given our strong strategic policy push to field interoperable
combat identification capability under NATO’s Defense Cooperation Initiative so that
deployed forces would be aware of units around them, thereby reducing fratricide
risks, this argument seems rather specious. Nonetheless, it added to the delays in the
cooperative program
How did this disconnect occur? “The way we’ve always done it” is embedded in the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the resulting International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). Originally the AECA was designed to increase Congress’ role
in international arms sales (and foreign policy) in response, among other things, to arms
shipments to questionable regimes. While perhaps a noble purpose in 1976, today the
implementation of ITAR severely restricts cooperation with even our closest allies. The
Blue Force Tracker is but one instance where the disconnect between our stated strategy

and our implemented policy on export activities has created havoc in our relations with
partners and Allies.
This disconnect forces one to consider whether our current policies and procedures,
focused on a Cold War model of preventing the spread of weapons and protecting our
technology, still make sense in an age where we have to rely on allies and partners to
confront our enemies in an extremely complex environment. In a time when we want
our allies to do more than let us help them defend their own countries, can we afford to
continue alienating them? When we consider that they are a principal source of our
strength, does it continue to make sense to delay or prohibit them from acquiring the
same state of the art equipment that we use so that they can remain interoperable with
us on today’s battlefield? Do those procedures even make sense in an increasingly
globalized defense industrial environment where we are just as likely to block our own
access to state of the art equipment because foreign suppliers do not want to risk losing
control of their own equipment and intellectual property by becoming enmeshed in
ITAR controls through cooperative programs or sales? How does this help guarantee
our national security?
Many authors have written about the negative business aspects of the AECA and its
current implementation in ITAR. However, as a recent speaker at the Hudson Institute
observed, Congress recognizes that the defense industry is still making money and is
unwilling to change legislation that could result in increasing the chances of our
adversaries gaining technology just to ease the regulatory burden on industry.
Unfortunately, this discussion misses the strategic point. The issue is not the impact on
business, but rather the impact on the nation and our ability to achieve our strategic
objectives. Leaving aside the question of whether it really restricts access—it appears
our adversaries are having great success simply stealing our technology outside of
procurement channels so that only our closest allies are restricted—consider for a
moment the consequences in the broader arena of international relations. If the situation
were reversed, how willing would we be to commit forces that were technologically
inferior to fight and die beside advanced allies just because they asked us to? Would we
be willing to enter into restrictive technology agreements that diminish our sovereign
rights with respect to our own technology? Taking off my altruistic glasses and focusing
on reality, I have to think the answer would be no.
So what can be done about this dilemma? I have heard a number of people say that
we need to throw more bureaucrats at the problem. After all, we successfully process
tens of thousands of applications every year and if we just had more people working on
it than we could speed the process and reduce the backlog. In a time of limited
resources and massive federal budget deficits, is that really the answer? And would
faster processing of rejections to key allies, like the Danes, really help the problem?
I believe the answer lies instead in changing our philosophical approach. After over
50 years of successful alliances, in which our partners have fought by our side in
conflicts from Korea to Iraq and Afghanistan, spilling their blood to advance our
mutual objectives, they should have earned our trust. This trust does not have to be
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universal, but should certainly be extended to those who have stood beside us time and
again and embrace our philosophy on minimizing arms proliferation.
In the longer term, this may require modification of the AECA, the ITAR, and the
related munitions list. However, any such changes would be long, drawn out legislative
and bureaucratic undertakings. Moreover, there will always remain a need to protect
our sensitive information from (potential) adversaries, so perhaps they do not require
significant change.
In the nearer term we can achieve success in meeting our treaty obligations with
allies and developing better relations with our long-term strategic partners by working
inside established systems to grant what the Clinton administration called blanket ITAR
waivers. While those waivers never became a reality, the concept lived on and has
finally resulted in the U.S.-UK Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty that the President and
then Prime Minister Blair signed in June. If ratified and properly implemented, this
treaty will make it easier for US and UK defense companies to cooperate and sell
equipment and knowledge by eliminating the need for export control licenses processed
under the onerous ITAR procedures. Rapid ratification of this treaty and a statement of
intent to develop similar agreements with other key nations would send a positive
signal to our allies. Rapid expansion of the concept to other allies would materially
support our ongoing war efforts. By trusting our allies to support our standards, we can
effectively demonstrate our global leadership. As a positive side effect, we might also
free resources to put against other requirements rather than tying down more resources
to process an ever growing case load.
What does this mean for the Army? Enforcement of export controls are, after all, a
State Department responsibility. The answer is simple because we are frequently part of
the problem and we certainly suffer the consequences of it. Here in CONUS those
involved with providing Army concurrence to transfers need to leave behind legacy
protectionist thinking and contemplate the operational impact on the future battlefield.
The next time we consider providing technology like Blue Force Tracker—and while
still considering force protection issues—we should focus on the impact of allied forces
not deploying in the first place or, if that is too strategic for pragmatists, the human
impact of fratricide when allied forces don’t know we are there (or visa versa). Out in
the field, where tradition is more easily overcome by the realities of the current fight,
we must remember the exceptional effort that is occurring by leaders and soldiers at all
levels to work around the problems.
In the end, one thing is very clear. If we grieve for the casualties of our allies and
partners “as we grieve for our own” 4 as the President told the CENTCOM Coalition
Conference last May, then we owe it to those partners to ensure they have access to the
same capabilities that we promise the sons and daughters of our nation. Moreover, we
owe it to our own warriors to ensure those fighting side by side with them on the front
lines of tomorrow’s battlefields are fully capable of seamlessly integrating into our
mutual battlespace.
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